Developing a unitary patent system for Europe has been debated for over 50 years but never achieved.
joining the AUPC at this point is a curious move and one which is inconsistent with the UK's previous more general statements on Brexit. In particular, in February 2017 Theresa May while outlining key facets of Brexit stated that the UK would not be subject to the jurisdiction of the CJEU once it leaves the EU. The article highlights the difficulties with ameliorating this position with the UK's continued participation in the UPP post-Brexit. It argues that Brexit will likely sound the death knell for the UK's membership of EPUE. Moreover, although UK participation in the UPCt seems more likely there remains considerable challenges to tackle in this respect.
Furthermore, the question mark that exists over the UK's participation in the UPCt and EPUE post-Brexit has attendant consequences for the general feasibility of the UPP. Accordingly, this article argues that instead of focusing on how to keep the UK within the currently devised system, Brexit provides further impetus to pause and consider whether the current proposal is still worthwhile given that it will create a more complex and fragmented European patent landscape at the supranational level. Instead, this article echoes calls that a better solution would be to consider ways to modify the current system or redesign a new system to include not just the UK but also other European Patent Convention states which are not in the EU.
Introduction
also recently ratified the AUPC in April 2018, however, Germany has not done so.
7
Moreover, in the context of these two latter States, since 2012, two changes occurred which potentially jeopardise or at the very least raise important questions for the future operation and desirability of the planned UPP system, namely: (1) the UK voted to leave the EU in June 2016 (Brexit); and (2) a German constitutional complaint has been submitted against the ratification of the AUPC which is still ongoing.
8
This article focuses specifically on the former development, examining the effect of Brexit on the UK's participation in the planned EPUE and particularly in the UPCt system. It primarily examines the UK's participation in the UPCt system post-Brexit because the UK has given commitments on this and it is legally possible given that the UPCt is based on an international agreement, however, participation in the EPUE, as will be demonstrated is unlikely given that it is an EU right and not an international right. 9 Nonetheless, even in terms of the UPCt system, this article will argue that despite the UK announcing in November 2016 10 that it will remain part of the AUPC regardless of Brexit and its
7
Correct at the time of writing (May 2018). Justice of the European Union (CJEU). This is politically problematic for the UK's involvement in the UPCt, as it is inconsistent with the government's previous general statements on Brexit. Indeed, three months after the UK announced its continued intention to join the UPCt system Theresa May in her Prime Minister's address outlining key facets of Brexit stated that the UK will not be subject to the jurisdiction of the CJEU once it leaves the EU.
11
This was subsequently reiterated in the UK government's whitepaper on Brexit in February 2017. 12 Thus, it is difficult, if not impossible, to ameliorate the government's stated position on the UK's relationship with the CJEU post-Brexit, with its participation in the UPCt system. 13 Moreover, even if the UK were to modify this position and accept the CJEU's jurisdiction in this context post-Brexit which will be required to participate in the UPCt system, it is not clear that the UK's membership of the UPCt -as a non-EU Member State -would be compatible light-to-unified-patent-court-agreement (accessed 6 December 2017); see also "EPO President welcomes UK's decision to ratify UPC Agreement" (29 November 2016), available at https://www.epo.org/news-issues/news/2016/20161129.html (accessed 1 February 2018). 11 See Theresa May, Prime Minister's Speech, "The government's negotiating objectives for exiting the EU: PM speech" (17 January 2017), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-forexiting-the-eu-pm-speech (accessed 1 February 2018), in which she stated that: "So we will take back control of our laws and bring an end to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in Britain". 12 HM Government, Whitepaper, "The United Kingdom's exit from and new partnership with the European Union" (February 2017) available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-united-kingdoms-exit-from-and-newpartnership-with-the-european-union-white-paper (accessed 1 February 2018). 13 See also Ingve Björn Stjerna, "'Unitary patent' and court system -The British ratification paradox" (2 February 2017), available at http://www.stjerna.de/files/Unipat_UKratification.pdf (accessed 1 February 2018), pp. 4-5.
with EU law. As will be demonstrated, other non-EU Member States which are party to the European Patent Convention (EPC) but not in the EU are not currently allowed to sign the AUPC to take part in the UPCt system. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether the AUPC can be modified to accommodate the UK's peculiar position as a state which is currently in the EU but is shortly set to leave it. If it is modified in this way, then it would also be somewhat difficult to justify that the UK would be allowed to participate because it happened to be in the EU at the ratification date, but left the EU after this, whereas other EPC States not in the EU are not allowed participate in the AUPC and therefore any element of the UPP.
Regard must also be had to the CJEU's Opinion 1/09 14 on a previous iteration of the unified patent system involving non-EU Member States which was rejected as incompatible with EU law. An analysis of this opinion highlights the precarious nature of the UK's position in the UPCt and provides lessons on what measures the UK would arguably have to adopt to try to ensure its postBrexit participation in the UPCt system is compatible with EU law. However, this article argues that: (1) as noted, politically, the move is inconsistent with the UK government's stated general position on Brexit, as the UK would need to remain subject to the CJEU's jurisdiction in this context; (2) even if it does so, the UK would also have to meet additional requirements under Opinion 1/09 to safeguard EU law; and (3) even if all of these protections were guaranteed, the compatibility under EU law of the UK's participation in the UPCt system postBrexit could still subsequently be challenged. In effect, the article will demonstrate that the UK's future position in the UPCt system is still on precarious footing. and EPUE which will result will create a multi-layered and further fragmented
European patent system at the supra-national level. As will be demonstrated, this is far from the ideal of unitary patent protection initially proposed. These efforts may also be for naught as the intricate compromises required to keep the UK in the UPCt system could subsequently be challenged and held incompatible with EU law.
For these reasons, this article argues that instead of creating further compromises to bring the currently proposed system into effect resulting in a further fragmented supra-national patent landscape in Europe, Brexit and the difficulties posed for UK participation in the UPP provide another opportunity to re-evaluate the current proposals. Rather, than amending the AUPC to keep the UK as a party to it post-Brexit, this article echoes wider calls for there to be a reconsideration of the UPP proposal or as Jaeger has called for a "reset and go".
15
In short, the Brexit challenge provides even greater impetus to reconsider and redevelop a unitary patent package to include all EPC Contracting States.
16
This would achieve unitary protection for a broader range of states and reduce the complex and overlapping avenues for protection that will occur under the currently proposed scheme.
17
In making these arguments, the article is structured as follows: part two sets the discussion in context by providing an overview of the current Given that the EPC is not an EU legal instrument and instead is an international treaty concluded outside the EU system, the UK's position in this system will remain unchanged post-Brexit. However, an issue 19 It has been argued that Brexit could be the impetus required for a rethinking of the AUPC, to adopt an alternative model for the UPCt which would allow non-EU States to be party to it: see Thomas Jaeger, " This would result in an "EPUE" which has unitary effect in the participating EPC states. To do so, applicants must file a request to the EPO for unitary effect within one month of the publication of the patent grant in the European Patent Bulletin. 25
The unitary effect of the EPUE in participating states means that it has "equal effect in all participating Member States" and "should only be limited, transferred or revoked, or lapse, in respect of all the participating Member
States".
26
It is an EU right created by two EU regulations and central to its legal basis is the EU system of enhanced co-operation. To support this system, the UPP 21 See discussion in Jaeger, "Reset and Go", supra n. 15, part 4.2. also created the UPCt, which has jurisdiction for all EPUEs beyond the transitional period, and also for all classical EPs in the states which have ratified the AUPC.
27
As noted, although the UPP system was initially planned to include all EU Member States, however, agreement could not be reached, and it was decided to go ahead with the states who wanted to participate, using an enhanced cooperation scheme.
28
Twenty-six EU Member States -every state except Croatia and Spain -participate in this enhanced co-operation scheme. However, whilst Poland participated in the enhanced co-operation scheme, it subsequently announced it would not sign or ratify the AUPC, and thus will not currently participate in the UPP. 29 When and if, the UPP comes into operation, an EPUE can be applied for in the States which have ratified the AUPC. This means that depending on how many states have ratified the AUPC on the commencement of the system, one could initially have an EPUE for the seventeen states, eighteen states etc. However, the AUPC cannot take effect until it has been ratified by the UK, France, and Germany i.e. the three states with the greatest number of patents in the previous year.
30
Thus, the UK's recent ratification was practically significant in terms of when the system can commence but we still await the 27 For a full overview of the system, see McMahon, supra n. 17, pp. 48-50. outcome of the German constitutional complaint and whether it will ratify the system.
As an aside, the outcome and timing of Germany's ratification of the AUPC is important because the UPP system cannot take effect without this, and this is also significant for the UK's participation in the UPCt system. If the compliant is successful and Germany decides not to ratify the AUPC, the AUPC would then need to be amended to allow the system to continue without Secondly, in terms of the AUPC, this is an international agreement and therefore given that the UK has already ratified this, it is likely to endeavour to adopt measures to ensure it can legally remain part of the UPCt system postBrexit. There are, however, challenges remaining in this respect, discussed below.
Moreover, if the UK does this, post-Brexit it would likely be party to the AUPC and in the UPCt system, but not part of the EPUE. In practical terms, this would mean that patents with unitary effect (EPUEs) would not include the UK and instead would only be available for the other participating EU States. A national patent or classical EP would be needed to obtain patent protection in the UK.
Moreover, in such circumstances, in the UK context the UPCt would only be involved and have jurisdiction for classical EPs which are valid in the UK.
33
It is also questionable whether the further compromises which will be needed to allow the UK to participate in the UPCt post-Brexit and to bring the UPP system into effect are desirable given the shape of the currently proposed system. This is because the planned UPP system will give rise to multiple available at https://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2017/october/unified-patent-court-projectat-risk-amidst-uncertainties-in-the-uk-and-germany-says-expert/ (accessed 1 February 2018 avenues of patent protection and thus a further complicated and fragmented patent landscape. Applicants will still be able to apply for national patents through the national route in each state in which the patent is desired. Applicants will also be able to apply through the EPO for classical EPs in EPC states.
However, the post-grant life for these patents would either be under the jurisdiction of the UPCt for states which have ratified the AUPC or would go to national states when the patent is applied for in states which are not participating in the AUPC namely Croatia, Poland, Spain, or states which cannot ratify the AUPC, i.e. other EPC states which are not in the EU. Applicants could also apply to the EPO for a patent and register it for unitary effect (that is, an EPUE) in the participating states. This landscape is further complicated given that there will be a transitional period of seven years after the AUPC comes into effect, and during this time applicants can choose to opt out of the UPP system, meaning that patents would fall under the consideration of the national state post-grant and not the UPCt. Furthermore, as demonstrated, the system is planned to come into effect once it has the requisite number of ratifications to the AUPC and, therefore, there could initially be an EPUE with just seventeen, eighteen states etc., depending on how many states have ratified the AUPC at a given point in time. Thus, one may initially be able to obtain an EPUE for a smaller number of states and EPs or national patents in the remaining states.
34
Nonetheless, despite this complex and fragmented landscape created by the currently proposed UPP, the UK has recently ratified it.
However, significant future challenges are likely in this context, and it remains to be seen what will happen with the UK's role in the UPCt system postBrexit. In this vein, the UPCt is not a court of the EU; instead, it is described as 34 For an overview of the institutional complexity of the system, see McMahon, supra n. 17, pp.
51-52.
being modelled on the Benelux courts, The preamble also confirms that Contracting States to the AUPC will be responsible for damages arising from an infringement of EU law by the UPCt, including a failure to refer preliminary rulings to the CJEU, and it states that infringements by the UPCt are directly attributable to the Contracting States.
40
Moreover, the preamble refers to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, confirming that this is one of the sources of law applicable within the UPCt.
41
The UPCt thus 
43
There are limited EU laws concerning patents and limited substantive provisions in the regulations setting up the EPUE, which was intended to limit the CJEU's influence in this area. products.
46
Thus, the CJEU's influence is more directly evident in such fields. The role that the CJEU has in the functioning of the UPCt creates significant challenges for the UK's future in the UPP system, particularly because the Brexit whitepaper stated that the UK government intended to "bring an end to the jurisdiction of the CJEU in the UK". 50 Given the role the CJEU has in the UPP system, the UK simply could not be part of the current system without acceding to its jurisdiction in this context post-Brexit. A potential avenue by which the UK could justify an exception for patent law is evident in the whitepaper, which stated that even though the CJEU's jurisdiction in the UK would end, "we will of course continue to honour our international commitments and follow international law".
51
The AUPC is an international agreement and not an EU instrument, and it was agreed upon prior to the Brexit referendum. Hence, it could be argued that the UK is merely maintaining this international commitment. The difficulty with this line of argument is that, unlike other international obligations, the operation of the UPCt as set out in the AUPC is directly tied to accepting the CJEU's role within the UPCt system, and it remains to be seen whether in the post-Brexit context it will be possible to negotiate an agreement on this for the UK and even if so, whether this will be politically palatable to the UK or other EU Member States.
Given that one of the aims of the UK government post-Brexit, as emphasised in the whitepaper, is "taking control over of our own laws" 52 and severing the control of the CJEU over domestic law, any suggestion of retaining this jurisdiction even in the field of patent law could be met with political resistance. Indeed, Douglas Carswell, a former member of the UK Independence This was accompanied by an online petition against the UK's ratification of the UPP.
55
These attempts to halt the ratification attracted very minor support and ultimately, did not affect the practical passage of relevant legislative orders or the UK's eventual ratification 51 Nonetheless, even though the UK has now ratified the AUPC prior to Brexit, it remains to be seen how the role of the CJEU and EU law in the UPCt system will be addressed in future in order for the UK to participate in the AUPC post-Brexit.
Roadblock II: The Unitary Patent Package -An EU-

Members-only club?
In this vein, to participate in the UPCt system, the UK would have to accept the role of the CJEU in this context, but even if did so, this would still not necessarily guarantee the UK's continued participation in the UPCt scheme post-Brexit. This is because the AUPC currently provides that the UPCt system is open only to EU members and it is questionable whether the system would be compatible with EU law if the UK -once it leaves the EU -is a participant.
In terms of the UPCt, Article 2(b) of the AUPC defines "Member State" as However, the system cannot commence until Germany ratifies it and as noted this is currently delayed due to the German constitutional complaint against the AUPC. It is therefore unclear whether the UPCt will come into force before the UK leaves the EU in March 2019. Moreover, even if it does, as noted questions remain about the UK's continued participation in the UPCt system or EPUE postBrext.
Once the UK officially leaves the EU -after the two-year negotiation period started by the procedure set out in Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty -absent relevant transitional measures being adopted, the two EU regulations establishing the EPUE will cease to apply in the UK. Therefore, without other international agreements, the UK's entitlement to participate in the EPUE element would also cease, given that these regulations set up the scheme for granting and recognising unitary patents. 57
Moreover, to safeguard its continued participation in the UPCt, the UK would need to negotiate and agree appropriate international agreements with other Contracting States involved in the AUPC, and the AUPC would need to be amended to expand the definition of member to include the UK as a non-EU state.
However, most importantly, any agreement would have to safeguard the primacy of EU law in the UPCt system, 
Opinion 1/09 -Obstacles for the UK's post-Brexit role in the UPCt as a non-EU state
In Opinion 1/09 the CJEU considered a proposal for the creation of a "Community patent" which would be granted by the EPO. The Community patent would have "equal effect throughout the whole European Union, and could be granted, transferred, declared invalid or lapse in respect of that territorial area".
59
It was also intended to include an "international agreement to be concluded between the Member States, the European Union and third countries which are parties to the EPC… creating a court with jurisdiction to hear actions related to European and Community patents," 60 the "European and Community Patents Court" (PC). The CJEU was tasked with considering whether the planned agreement creating this unified patent litigation system was compatible with provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community.
61
The CJEU held it was incompatible with EU law for several reasons, including: (1) the PC would not be part of the EU legal order and not part of the judicial framework within the EU, 62 yet despite this would have to interpret EU law;
63
(2) relatedly, it would deprive national Member States of their jurisdiction to decide certain aspects of patent law, as the PC would have exclusive jurisdiction in certain areas. 64 This would also deprive national courts of their task of implementing EU law and there would be no way to ensure harmonisation of EU law which is generally provided for by the EU's preliminary referral procedure to the CJEU. The draft agreement allowed for preliminary referrals to the PC but removed this power from national courts; 65 and (3) if the PC was found to be in breach of EU law, the decision would not be capable of being subject to infringement proceedings under EU law, or claims in damages against EU Member States. 66 Thus, proceedings for enforcing compliance with EU law were absent.
67
Following this opinion, the draft agreement to create a unified patent system was amended which led to the current UPP system which does not include non-EU states.
Notably, following the issuance of Opinion 1/09, the EU's Commission Services issued a paper examining possible solutions for creating a unified patent system in which it stated that the effect of Opinion 1/09 was to exclude membership of third States, states -and it is questionable why attempts were not made to address concerns raised by Opinion 1/09 in a way which would also have allowed non-EPC states to remain party to the system. Modifying the system to include only EU Member States was arguably considered the easiest route to address concerns raised in Opinion 1/09, however, the extent to which these concerns are effectively 67 See also discussion of the reasons for the finding of incompatibility with EU law in Gordon and Pascoe, supra n. 57, para. 14. 68 See Note from the Presidency to the Council Doc 10630/11, Annex II "Solutions for a Unified Patent Litigation System -The way forward after the Opinion 1/09 of the CJEU, Non Paper of the European Commission", available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2010630%202011%20INIT (accessed 1 February 2018) which states at Annex II, p. 7 that: "As a result of opinion 1/09 of the CJEU, it appears that the participation of third countries must be excluded" and, at p. 10, "As set out above, on the basis of the opinion of the CJEU, third states may not participate in this agreement." addressed, and to which the current proposal is compatible with EU law, remain subject to question. Following the UK's withdrawal from the EU, and without further transitional or other agreements being put in place to the contrary, the UK would be outside the EU judicial system therefore the legal remedies and procedures designed to ensure legality of EU law would not bind the UK. It would also not have a duty of "sincere cooperation" once it ceased to be a national EU Member State. Hence, these safeguards would not apply, and the criticisms raised in Opinion 1/09 against the PC proposal, could therefore also be raised against the UPP system with the UK as a participant in it post-Brexit.
Furthermore, the CJEU in Opinion 1/09 stated that the planned PC could be distinguished from the Benelux Court as:
70 Jaeger, "Reset and Go", supra n. 15, p. 273. 71 Opinion 1/09, para. 68. 72 Ibid., para. 69. 73 Ibid., para. 70.
the Benelux Court is a court common to a number of Member States, situated, consequently, within the judicial system of the European Union, its decisions are subject to mechanisms capable of ensuring the full effectiveness of the rules of the European Union. 74
In the currently proposed UPP, the UPCt has been designed as a court common to member states of the EU and akin to the Benelux court to address this point.
75
However, if the UK were a participant of the UPCt system post-Brexit it would change the position of the court as it would no longer be a court common to EU Member States given that the UK would then fall outside the EU legal order. This would raise further questions on the compatibility with EU law of the currently proposed system and could increase the likelihood of the UPCt system being challenged before the CJEU after it comes into effect.
Opinion 1/09 -Minimum safeguards to ensure compatibility with EU law
Nonetheless, it has been argued by Gordon and Pascoe 76 that the UK could potentially continue to participate in the AUPC and therefore UPCt system postBrexit provided it adopted safeguards for EU law in the patent field to address Opinion 1/09. To do so, at a minimum the UK would need to ensure: (1) the primacy of EU law in the operation of the system in the UK. In this vein, Gordon example by accepting relevant EU competition law, fundamental rights etc., alongside substantive EU patent provisions, for example the Biotechnology Directive; (2) a system of preliminary referral for patent law would be necessary to ensure the harmonised interpretation of EU law. This would require careful consideration of EU law on preliminary referral procedures currently set out in Article 267 TFEU which provides that the CJEU has jurisdiction to give such rulings where questions are raised by a "court or tribunal of a Member State".
78
The UK would cease to be a Member State of the EU at the end of its withdrawal from the EU so the CJEU would not have jurisdiction under Article 267 to accept referrals from the UK. However, Gordon and Pascoe argue that subject to an international agreement which the Union was party to, the CJEU could be vested with jurisdiction to accept preliminary references from the non-EU states' courts; 79 (3) finally, there would need to be a way to ensure the UK could be subject to infringement proceedings for failing to comply with EU law in this context, to ensure that private parties can obtain damages for breaches. The CJEU only has jurisdiction to hear infringement actions against EU Member States under arts. 258, 259, and 260 TFEU. If adopted, these measures could help to safeguard the UK's place in the UPCt system post-Brexit by ensuring it is compatible with EU law. However, 78 Ibid., para. 84. 79 Gordon and Pascoe, supra n. 57, para. 86. Art. 16(2) of the ECAA (European Common Aviation Area Agreement) provides a precedent for this and the authors argue that a similar argument could be used to allow the UK to participate in the UPP. 80 Ibid, para. 78. 81 Ibid., paras. 80 and 86.
these measures are likely to be difficult to negotiate and implement, and it is highly questionable whether they would be politically palatable for the UK or for other EU Member States considering the broader context of the Brexit debate.
Moreover, the relevant agreements and amendments to the AUPC which would be required would likely take considerable time to conclude and to implement.
Furthermore, given the statements highlighted from Opinion 1/09 and the previous narrow reading of that Opinion by the Commission, after the UK leaves the EU if it is in the UPCt system and this system has commenced, the compatibility of the system with EU law would almost inevitably be challenged before the CJEU. Based on the foregoing, if a narrow reading of Opinion 1/09 was applied, the CJEU could likely find the UK's participation post-Brexit -as a non-EU state -of the UPCt incompatible with EU law. Indeed, Gordon and Pascoe also expressly acknowledge this point stating, in their view, that it would be constitutionally possible for the UK to continue to participate in the UPCA after "Brexit", so long as it signs up to all of the provisions of the Agreement which protect EU constitutional principles. However, there is a risk that the CJEU would reach the opposite conclusion. 82 Moreover, it is important to consider whether all these further compromises which would be required for the UK to continue to participate in the UPCt postBrexit are worthwhile. Arguably, instead of focusing on how to position the UK in such a way as to allow continued participation, we should be thinking about whether the rules for participation and current shape of the UPP scheme needs to be changed to offer a more inclusive unitary patent system. If we are considering solutions to enable ongoing UK participation in the UPCt system 82 Ibid., para. 134(b).
post-Brexit when it will be a non-EU Member State, surely, it would be more prudent to consider alongside this how other non-EU States who are party to the EPC could also participate in the current UPP or a similar but reconfigured unified patent system.
Consequences of UK non-participation in the UPP
The foregoing has demonstrated some of the main hurdles which remain for the UK's participation in the UPP post-Brexit. This issue has significant implications, because if the UPCt or EPUE were to go ahead in their current form without the UK participation post-Brexit, this would have adverse consequences both for the UK and the UPP system more generally. The UK IPO has already leased a space to host this branch,
85
and has advertised for judges to sit there.
86
However, given the UK is leaving the EU questions have been raised on whether it should retain this seat of the UPCt and other locations, In effect, the foregoing highlights that the UK and patent applicants would lose out on benefits which were deemed to arise from the UK joining the EPUE, as outlined in the UK Impact Assessment for the Unitary Patent. 
97
Accordingly, some patent applicants could be discouraged from patenting in the UK due to continuing high costs of renewal and the lack of a streamlined process. This is, however, less likely for larger patent applicants given the size of the UK market and benefits arising from entry to it.
Thirdly, if the UK is unable to participate in the EPUE or UPCt system post-Brexit, this would have knock-on consequences for the system in general.
The proposed UPP was an attempt following longstanding debate to reduce postgrant fragmentation in the European patent system. However, over time it has morphed into a much-reduced unification of patent law in Europe than that which was originally advanced. Fourthly, it is questionable whether the EPUE will be as economically feasible if the UK, one of the states with the largest number of patents granted in Europe, is not party to the system. For some patent applicants, depending on how many European states they wish to patent in, it may be more attractive to go down the national patenting route rather than seek an EPUE and validate a patent in the UK and other EPC countries which are not in the EU. Moreover, the renewal fees for the EPUE were calculated under the presumption that the UK 98 It has been argued elsewhere the system is likely to increase fragmentation at a supranational level. See McMahon, supra n. 17. would be party to the system, and these may need to be reconsidered if this is not the case.
Conclusion
There are still uncertainties and hurdles ahead for the UK's participation in the currently conceived UPP post-Brexit. To remain party to the UPCt system in its current form, the UK would have to accede to the jurisdiction of the CJEU in this context post-Brexit and an international agreement would have to be concluded to this effect between it and the EU. It would also have to negotiate modifications of the AUPC to change the definition of "member" to accommodate the UK's position once it leaves the EU. Furthermore, it would need to adequately guarantee protections for EU law in order to address issues raised by Opinion 1/09 for when it is no longer an EU Member State. However, reaching such agreements is likely to be a difficult and time-consuming process. There is also likely to be political resistance to such moves given the broader context of the Brexit debate.
Moreover, even if such agreements were concluded the resulting system could still be challenged before the CJEU, which would then need to expressly consider whether the UPCt system is compatible with EU law if the UK as a non-EU state is a participant in it. As demonstrated above, the reasoning in Opinion 1/09 means that much would depend on the safeguards for EU law which were embedded in the system. Moreover, if the UK's post-Brexit participation in the UPCt system was deemed compatible with EU law, this would raise the question of whether other non-EU states party to the EPC should not also be allowed to join the AUPC or if not, on what basis these States should be distinguished from a post-Brexit UK in this context.
